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NOVARTIS AG V. UNION OF INDIA
I. INTRODUCTION
A decision in Novarfis AG v. Union of India,' an Indian Supreme Court case,
was announced on April 1, 2013.2 The Supreme Court heard the final
arguments from both sides in September 2012. The much anticipated decision
has the potential to shake up the landscape of the pharmaceutical industry and
public health in India because it concerns the application of a controversial
provision of the Indian Patents Act of 2005, Section 3(d). The Supreme Court
has interpreted Section 3(d) in a manner that may significantly limit the ability
of pharmaceutical companies to obtain "secondary patents" on life-saving
drugs. So-called secondary patents, or "patents that cover alternative structural
forms, of the base molecule," have frequently been referenced in the debate
about Section 3(d).3
Controversy surrounds Section 3(d) in three major respects. First, Section
3(d) is an unusual provision among different countries' patent laws because it
imposes.a requirement of "enhanced efficacy" over the prior art before a patent
on a reformulation or modification of an original pharmaceutical compound
can be obtained. Second, Section 3(d) applies only to pharmaceutical product
patents, not patents in any other field of technology. Third, the lower courts in
Novar/is AG have defined "efficacy" in Section 3(d) narrowly to mean
"therapeutic efficacy" only. This narrow interpretation drew umbrage from
petitioner Novartis as unsupported by the text of the statute and damaging to
incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.
This Article represents the culmination of several months of research
consisting of analysis of primary documents, review of the literature, and
interviews. It advances the following propositions: (1) Under the Indian
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 3(d) of the 2005 Amendment of the
Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India), available at http://supremeco
urtofmdia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf.
2 This Article was originally written between January 2013 and March 31, 2013. The decision
in the case was handed down on April 1, 2013, the day after the Article was originally written. See
Nirmala George, India's Top Court to Deliver Novartis Judgment, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 31, 2013, 3:55
AM), http://news.yahoo.com/indias-top-court-delivers-novartis-judgment-074548556.html;
Kaustubh Kulkarni, Big Pharma Waits Nervously On Glivec Patent Verdict, REUTERS INDIA (Mar. 27,
2013, 8:10 PM), http://in.reuters.com/aricle/2013/03/27/india-drugs-patent-novartis-glivec-id
INDEE92Q02E20130327; E. Kumar Sharma, SC Verdict On Novartis' Glivec Case Expected On
April 1, Bus. TODAY INDIA (Mar. 28, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/sc-
verdict-on-novartis-glivec-case-expected-on-april-1/1/193667.html; Indo Asian News Service, SC
Verdict on Novartis AG's Patent Claim April, YAHOO! NEWS, Mar. 29, 2013, http://india.nydaily
news.com/business/782d17a2316f7221bb1881ef2ef47d57/sc-verdict-on-novartis-ags-patent-clai
m-april-1#ixzz2P972KmUF.
3 See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat, Kenneth C. Shadlen & Tahir M. Amin, Challenges to India's
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws, 337 SCIENCE 414, 414-15 (2012).
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Indian Patents Act as requiring enhanced efficacy in a manner not coextensive
with the inventive step and utility requirements for patentability, Section 3(d) is
not compliant with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), the World Trade Organization's (WTO) minimum
standards for intellectual property protection.4
(2) Notwithstanding TRIPS compliance, a requirement of efficacy for
secondary patents under Section 3(d) may benefit India by striking a better
balance between pharmaceutical innovation and India's public health concerns
than strict TRIPS compliance would.
(3) A broad interpretation of Section 3(d)'s enhanced efficacy requirement
would be the interpretation most consistent with the claimed purpose of
Section 3(d) to block patenting of unimportant, minor modifications of prior
art, although it does so imperfectly.
(4) A construction of efficacy as therapeutic efficacy creates an unprincipled
distinction between "therapeutic" and other "efficacy" that does not accord
with patent law theory, although it may nevertheless further India's public
health aims. Insofar as India's underlying motivation for Section 3(d) is
inconsistent with patent law theory, India should make explicit the true purpose
of Section 3(d) and argue that it should not have been required to comply fully
with TRIPS by 2005.
(5) NovarisAG provides an example of a pharmaceutical product that would
fulfill a broader requirement of enhanced efficacy, but would fail a narrower
requirement of "enhanced therapeutic efficacy" despite embodying a significant
achievement over the prior art.
Part II of this Article describes the legal background and procedural history
of the Novartis AG case leading up to the Supreme Court decision. Part III will
explore what "evergreening" means and will argue that it does not occur in the
way it has frequently been argued in India. Part IV sets out the three possible
interpretations of Section 3(d)'s enhanced efficacy requirement from which the
Indian Supreme Court chose and the legal and policy consequences of each. It
will address important considerations of each, including TRIPS compliance,
public health concerns, and incentives for innovation. Part V returns to
Novaris AG and argues that Novartis's patent application for the cancer drug
Glivec should not have been rejected on Section 3(d) grounds under a broad
interpretation of enhanced efficacy. Part VI concludes.
4 Linda L. Lee, Trials and TRIPS-ulalions: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 281 (2008).
[Vol. 21:223
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II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF NOVARTISAG
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND-INDIA'S PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAWS
India's current patent laws are inextricably tied to its desire, following
independence from Britain, to establish a patent system that prioritizes its
country-specific goals, rather than Western goals. The Indian Patents Act of
1970 (1970 Act) explicitly prohibited patents on pharmaceutical products,
although it allowed patents on processes for making pharmaceutical compounds.5
The 1970 Act was a "deliberate choice to stimulate the lagging Indian economy
by promoting domestic drug manufacturing. '6  The law had also been
influenced by the Ayyangar Committee Report, a report commissioned by the
Indian government in 1959, that had recommended that "underdeveloped"
countries like India enact patent law provisions that would protect them from
exploitation by developed countries.7  Without product patents, Indian
companies were free to make, sell, and use, at highly competitive prices, drugs
invented elsewhere. India's generic drug industry boomed over the next three
decades, capitalizing on innovation by multinational companies (MNCs) that
could not obtain patents under Indian law. India earned the nickname
"pharmacy of the world" for its flourishing generic pharmaceutical industry and
export of generics.8
Things took a turn in 1995, however, when India sought to become one of
the inaugural members of the WTO. Although it fought a treaty mandating
comprehensive intellectual property rights and insisted that patent protection be
tailored to a country's level of economic development, it eventually submitted
to signing TRIPS as a condition of joining the WTO,9 "fear[ing] restrictions on
its exports" if it refused. 10 India did, however, negotiate a transition period in
which it did not have to bring its patent laws into full compliance with TRIPS
until January 1, 2005.11
6 Id. at 290-91.
6 Id. at 291.
7 N. RAJAGOPOLA AYYANGAR, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE
PATENT LAW 19-20 (1959).
8 Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and
the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 495, 536-37 (2007) ("India has
been a net exporter of drugs since 1988-89 ... "); Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013
S.C. 1311, at 2 (India), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf.
9 Lee, supra note 4, at 293.
10 Mueller, supra note 8, at 517.
1 Lee, supra note 4, at 293.
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In 2005, India enacted the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 (2005
Amendment), 12 which aimed to bring India into compliance with TRIPS.13 The
2005 Amendment, inter aia, enabled the patenting of pharmaceutical products. 14
Section 3(d), however, limited the expansion of pharmaceutical patents by
precluding patenting of:
The mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which
does not result in enhancement of the known efficacy of that
substance ... For the purposes of this clause, salts,
esters..., combinations and other derivatives of known
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless
they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.' 5
The purpose of this provision, as has been expounded ad nauseum in the
literature, is to limit "evergreening."1 6 Evergreening is a term, used primarily by
detractors of the alleged practice, to describe the acquisition of secondary
patents on reformulations or minor modifications of pharmaceutical products
in order to unfairly extend the monopoly over the drug beyond the life of the
initial patent. 17
When asked whether evergreening as described by its opponents occurs in
India, practitioners interviewed in this study were equivocal. Many stated that it
depends on "who you're talking to," or that it occurs insofar as pharmaceutical
companies frequently obtain secondary patents, but that whether they do so in
contravention of patent law or with "malicious intention" is less certain.' 8 This
Article will explore this question in detail below.
What people do agree on is that Section 3(d) creates a barrier to obtaining
pharmaceutical patents and that the enhanced efficacy requirement is unclear
for two reasons. First, it is unclear what is meant by "efficacy." Second, it is
12 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=128116.
13 Id.
14 Lee, supra note 4, at 294.
15 Id. at 294-95.
16 Lisa Latrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical
Patents and University Licensing 17 MuCH. TELECOMi. & TECH. L. REv. 299, 304-05 (2010), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volseventeen/ouellette.pdf, Sampat, Shadlen & Amin, supra note 3, at 414.
'7 Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law's Inherent Anticpation Doctrne, 45
Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1106 (2008).
18 Interview with Adheesh Nargolkar and Fiona DeSouza (Jan. 15, 2013). See also Interview of
A.C. (Jan. 9, 2013). A.C., a patent attorney who has requested anonymity, stated in response to
the question, "Does 'evergreening' occur in India?": "It depends on how you define it.
Evergreening happens if having a secondary patent is evergreening."
[Vol. 21:223
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unclear "what kind of data will be required to establish 'efficacy'" to the
satisfaction of Section 3(d).19 India's Patent Rules, comparable to Tite 37 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), and the Indian Manual of Patent
Office Practice and Procedure, comparable to the U.S. Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP), contain no guidance on what would satisfy the
enhanced efficacy requirement, leaving it unclear to inventors and practitioners
how much they must invest in research and development (R&D) before they
can obtain a patent.20
B. DRUG PATENTS AND DRUG PRICES
The chairman of Cipla, a major Indian generics manufacturer, stated that the
1970 Act was "the dawn of a Golden Age" for the Indian pharmaceutical
industry, while the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in 2005 was
"one of the greatest predictable tragedies the world has witnessed."'21 Indeed,
Section 3(d) has been touted by many generic drug companies, patients'
associations, and such non-government organizations (NGOs) as Lawyers
Collective and M~decins Sans Frontires (MSF) as crucial to curbing the
detrimental effect of the 2005 Amendment on patients' access to affordable
generic medicines.
These generic companies and public health activists often cite the fact that
most Indians are not able to afford life-saving on-patent branded drugs like
Glivec, which treats leukemia.2 Glivec costs a patient about $70,000 per year in
the United States or $26,160 per year in India; generic versions in India only
cost about $2,500 year.23 These prices are prohibitive in India, a country that
lacks a social safety net for its poor.24 In 2005, India's per capita expenditure on
health care was only about $28 per year, with $3 per capita spent on
pharmaceuticals, compared to $5,635 per capita health care spending in the
U.S.25 According to the Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India
19 Mueller, supra note 8, at 553.
20 See id at 554; THE OFFICE OF CONTROLLER GENERAL OF PATENTS, DESIGNS & TRADEMARKS,
MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §5 2(1)(j), 3(d), 3(e) (2011).
21 Mueller, supra note 8, at 539-40.
22 See Sierra Dean, India's Controversial New Patent Regime: The End of Affordable Generics?, 40 INT'L
LAw. 725, 732 (2006); An Open Letter to the CEO and President of Novartis, DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/open-letter-Ceo-and-
president-novartis.
23 Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India's Supreme Court to Hear Dispute on Drug Patents, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/global/indias-supreme-
court-to-hear-long-simmering-dispute-on-drug-patents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
24 Mueller, supra note 8, at 542.
25 Id. at 543.
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(OPPI), less than 4% of the population has health insurance.26 Thus, most drug
purchases are paid for out-of-pocket.27 In January 2013, Mr. Tapan Ray, the
Director General of OPPI, stated that only 1% of the Indian Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is government spending on health care, out of 4.5% total of the
GDP spent on health care in India generally.28
Section 3(d) ensures that generic manufacturers are free to sell subsequent
versions of a drug once the original patent on the active pharmaceutical
ingredient expires.29 In Novartis AG, since Novartis never obtained a first
patent in India on imatinib free base to begin with, generics manufacturers are
already free to produce generic Glivec. 30 Generic companies are able to sell the
drug at much lower prices than Novartis can because they did not have to incur
hefty research and development costs developing the drug and getting it
approved.
However, Section 3(d) is only a part of the equation for increasing access to
generic medicines. Since drugs like Glivec are by prescription only, access to
the drugs is mediated by a health professional and access to diagnostic' tests. A
tunnel-like focus on the price of medicines ignores these threshold conditions
to access to medicine and the overall availability of treatment to poor patients.
Mr. Tapan Ray highlighted this problem in his interview. In his view, "it is
important to think of healthcare as a three-stage process. First, you need to
have access to a doctor, who can examine you. Second, you need to undergo
tests, such as MRIs, to obtain a diagnosis. Only when a doctor prescribes
medicine, can the price of medicine matter."31 Yet, he pointed out, the Indian
government does not control the price of doctors' fees and diagnostic tests,
focusing only on the price of medicines.32
In addition, the Indian government has alternative means to control drug
prices. Mr. Ray suggests that insurance companies and the Indian government
procure medicines directly, negotiate volume discounts, and provide the
medicines for free or at reduced prices to the needy. 33 India also has a system
of compulsory licenses in which generic companies can apply to the Controller
of Patents to force patent holders to give licenses to the generic manufacturers
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Interview with Tapan Ray, Dir. Gen., Org. of Pharm. Producers of India (Jan. 25, 2013).
29 See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India), available
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid= 128116.
30 See discussion infra Part II.D.
31 Interview with Tapan Ray, supra note 28.
32 Id.
33 Id.
[Vol. 21:223
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in limited situations. 34 Although only one compulsory license has been granted,
to Natco Pharma for Nexavar, Bayer's cancer drug,35 more seem to be coming
down the pipeline, perhaps spurred by this watershed event.36
C. TRIPS ARTICLE 27.1
India has argued since Section 3(d) has been enacted that it does not violate
TRIPS, but rather takes advantage of "flexibilities" for developing countries
offered by TRIPS.37 In order to determine what TRIPS demands and clarify
TRIPS's role in the debate about Section 3(d), I devote this section to exploring
the language and meaning of the relevant section of TRIPS. The text of TRIPS
Article 27.1 can be divided into two components. The first states that: "patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application."38 This section lays out the basic premise that
patents must be available for "all fields of technology" subject to the three basic
requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. 39 No other requirements
are named, giving rise to a possible negative inference that no other
patentability requirements are permitted. The second component states
"patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as
to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are
imported or locally produced." 4  This component is known as the "non-
34 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 544, 583; NISHITH DESAI ASSOCIATES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN INDIA 29 (2013), available at http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/useruplead/pdfs/
Research%20papers/IntellectualProperty Law in India.pdf.
35 Kiran Kabtta Somvanshi, Natco Pharma Awarded the Compulsoy Licence to Manufacture Bayer's
Cancer Drug Nexavar, ECON. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
2013-03-08/news/37561874 1.compulsory-license-nexavar-cancer-drug.
36 Tracy Staton, India to Hit Roche, BMS with Compulsory Licenses on 3 Cancer Drugs,
FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/india-hit-roche-bms-comp
ulsory-licenses-3-cancer-drugs/2013-01-13.
37 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION REGIONAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: PAPERS AND PERSPECTIVES 11-12, 63-64
(2010), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js1752/en/ [hereinafter WHO
REGIONAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA] (explaining that TRIPS's failure to lay down standards
for applying the "novelty" and "inventive step" requirements of patent eligibility opened the door
for India to carve out certain subject matter eligible for patent protection).
38 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]
(setting forth obligations for patent protection).
39 Id. (emphasis added); infra note 121.
40 TRIPS, supra note 38.
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discrimination clause" of TRIPS because it appears on its face to contemplate
non-discrimination among different fields of technology.41
Dissecting the meaning of the language of TRIPS Article 27.1 given the
dearth of case law from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is more of
an art than a science.42 Nevertheless, some guidance can be found in case law
from other jurisdictions and literature. First, numerous scholars have stated
that TRIPS reflects a Western conception of intellectual property rights.43
Several scholars state that TRIPS is intended to be a set of "minimum
standards" for intellectual property protection.44 Under this interpretation, the
first component of Article 27.1 can be seen as establishing a floor of intellectual
property rights, such that intellectual property rights should not be denied for
lack of additionally imposed requirements.
Still, one of the few pharmaceutical patent cases tried before the WTO DSB,
United States v. India (DS50), seems to support "the residual power of states to
forge their own intellectual property laws and policies" when the black letter
rules of TRIPS do not clearly circumscribe them.45 In that case, which
concerned TRIPS Article 70.8, the government of India tried to postpone
implementation of the "mailbox" rule46 applicable to patents, leading the U.S. to
file suit before the DSB.47 Although India lost, the Appellate Body emphasized
that Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement states that members "shall be free to
41 Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical
Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1, 14 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 177, 179-80 (2008).
42 WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries 1995-2011, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/dispu-summary95-le.pdf (showing that only
four distinct disputes, European Communities v. Canada (DS114), United States v. India (DS50),
European Communities v. India (DS79), United States v. Canada (DS170), over pharmaceutical
patents have been adjudicated through the WTO's DSB from 1995 to 2011).
43 E.g., Mueller, supra note 8, at 545 (stating that WTO TRIPS Agreement requires "[a]
'westernized' patent system"); Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement
After U.S. v India, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 586 (1998) (explaining that it was the goal of
developed countries "to impose a comprehensive set of intellectual property standards on the rest
of the world" through TRIPS).
44 E.g., Rajnish Kumar Rai, Patentable Subject Matter Requirements: An Evaluation of Proposed
Exclusions to India's Patent Law in Lght of India's Obkgalions Under the TRIPs Agreement and Options for
India, 8 CHI-KENTJ. INTELL. PROP. 41, 57-61 (2008); WHO REGIONAL OFFCE FOR SOUTH-EAST
ASIA, supra note 37, at 3. But see Reichman, supra note 43, at 586 ("As ultimately enacted, these
were not 'minimum' standards on intellectual property protection in the classical sense of the
term: rather, they collectively expressed most of the standards of protection on which the
developed countries could agree among themselves.').
45 Reichman, supra note 43, at 596.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
47 Reichman, supra note 43, at 593.
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determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice."48
In light of the tension between freedom and obligation that TRIPS creates, I
turn to the non-discrimination clause of Article 27.1, which would be
particularly relevant in a hypothetical suit between the Swiss government and
Indian government. The Swiss government would be responsible for making a
claim before the WTO DSB on behalf of Novartis AG because Novartis AG is
a Swiss company.49 The Swiss government could allege that Section 3(d)
contravenes the non-discrimination clause by imposing additional barriers to
patenting pharmaceutical products compared to other fields of technology.
Most commentators reject the most restrictive interpretation of the non-
discrimination provision, finding that "Article 27.1 does not strictly require a
'single level of IP protection for all technologies or industries.' "50 In Canada
Pharmaceuticals,51 the WTO panel rejected a restrictive reading of Article 27.1 as
forbidding any different treatment of the various fields of technology.5 2 Rather,
unfair discrimination must be distinguished from differential treatment for
legitimate reasons.53
In Canada Pharmaceuticals, the European Union claimed that the Canadian
Patent Act violated Article 27.1's non-discrimination clause because "it treated
drug patents less favorably than patents for inventions in other fields."5 4
Canada's patent statute contained a "Stockpiling Exception" which stated that it
is not patent infringement to make, instruct, use, or sell a patented invention
during a period set by regulation for the purpose of preparing a stockpile of
products to sell after the patent expires.55 The only regulations promulgated
under the exception, however, applied to medicines, enabling generic
manufacturers to stockpile identical generic versions of a drug beginning from
six months before the drug patent expired.56 The dispute panel of the WTO
found that a law that differentiates between different fields of technology is not
necessarily in violation of Article 27.1 as long as it is supported by a bonafide
reason to differentiate.57 The TRIPS compliance question in Novartis AG then,
48 Id. at 596.
49 Novartis is headquartered in Basel, Switzerland. About Novartis, NovARTIS, http://www.no
varis.com/about-novartis/locations/index.shtnl (last visited May 24, 2014).
50 Stout, supra note 41, at 181.
51 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceulical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
52 Stout, supra note 41, at 181.
53 Id. at 182.
54 Id. at 184.
55 Id. at 183.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 185.
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is whether Section 3(d) legitimately differentiates between non-pharmaceutical
and pharmaceutical patents.
D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF NOVARTIS AG
With TRIPS and India's legal and socioeconomic milieu in mind, I turn to
the facts and procedural posture of Novarlis AG. In the early 1990s, Novartis
scientists made the breakthrough discovery that imatinib, the free base molecule
on which Glivec is based, had startling anticancer properties.5 8 In 1993,
Novartis AG filed patents for imatinib free base worldwide.5 9 Novartis received
patents in countries including the U.S.,60 but did not apply for a patent in India
because at the time, the 1970 Act banned pharmaceutical product patents.61 In
1998, however, Novartis submitted a "mailbox" patent application in India for
imatinib mesylate, a beta-crystalline form of imatinib that is used in Glivec.62
The patent claimed priority from a similar patent application filed in 1997 in
Switzerland.63 Under the "mailbox" system, patent applicants could submit
applications ahead of time, which the Indian patent office would review when
India became TRIPS compliant in 2005.64
In January 2006, the Chennai Patent Office examined the imatinib mesylate
patent and rejected it on grounds of (1) lack of novelty and inventive step
because the 1993 patents had already claimed "all pharmaceutical salt forms of
imatinib," and (2) Section 3(d), because the new product did not demonstrate
enhanced efficacy despite having a 30% increase in bioavailability over the prior
art.
6 5
58 Leslie A. Pray, Gleevec: The Breakthrough in Cancer Treatment, NATURE EDUCATION (2008),
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/gleevec-the-breakthrough-in-cancer-treatment-565.
59 Lee, supra note 4, at 297-98.
60 U.S. Patent No. 5,521,184 (filed Apr. 28, 1994), availabk at http://www.ipface.org/casestu
dy/doc/US5521184A.pdf (continuation-in-part of U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 42,322
(filed Apr. 2, 1993)).
61 Lee, supra note 4, at 297.
62 The Orange Pill, Now in 3D: Rewriting Patent Histoy?, ACCESS (Lawyers Collective lIV/ADS
Unit, Mumbai, India), Mar. 2012, at 4 [hereinafter Access March].
63 Id.; Written Submissions on Bebalf of the Intervenor, SPICY IP, http://www.spicyip.com/docs/peti
tion-tenth-pdf.pdf (last visited May 24, 2014) [hereinafter Written Submissions] (noting that July
1997 was the patent's priority date); see also Raghul Sudheesh, Novartis Case Profession Shamnad
Basbeers Academic Intervention Before the Supreme Court, BAR & BENCH (Nov. 22, 2012, 10:20 AM),
http://barandbench.com/content/novartis-case-professor-shamnad-basheers-academicinterven
tion-supreme-court#.UVjziVcQOfO (explaining Professor Basheer's intervention and arguments
before the Indian Supreme Court).
64 Lee, supra note 4, at 293.
65 Id. at 298-99; Helen Pidd, Indian Court to Hear Crudal Novartis Patent Case on Cut-Price Generic
Drugs, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/
aug/21 /novartis-court-batde-glivec-patent.
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Novartis appealed the rejection to the Madras High Court in May 2006,
opposed by the Indian Government, several generic drug companies, and an
Indian NGO, the Cancer Patients Aid Association.66 Novartis argued, inter aia,
that the Patent Controller erred under Section 3(d), that Section 3(d) was not
compliant with Article 27 of TRIPS, and that Section 3(d) was
unconstitutional. 67 The case was bifurcated between the Madras High Court
and the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (JPAB).68
The Madras High Court took up the issues of TRIPS compliance and
constitutionality, issuing an opinion against Novartis on August 8, 2007.69 First,
the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review whether Section 3(d) is
TRIPS compliant.70 It concluded that it lacked authority to decide whether a
domestic Indian law is compliant with an international treaty because the Indian
government had not "domesticated" TRIPS.71 In other words, Iidia had not
officially made the treaty binding law domestically.72 It found that Article 64 of
TRIPS provides for dispute resolution through the WTO DSB and
recommended that the Swiss government take its case there.7 3 The high court
also' considered whether it could provide declaratory relief that Secti6n 3(d) is
not TRIPS compliant.74 It concluded that it could provide such relief under the
Indian Constitution, but decided not to in this instance because it would "serve
no useful purpose to the petitioner," as the court could not compel the Indian
parliament to change the law to comply with TRIPS.75 Thus, the court did not
reach the question of whether Section 3(d) is compliant with TRIPS Artile 27.
Second, the court decided that Section 3(d), particularly the term enhanced
efficacy, does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.76 The court
rejected Novartis' arguments that the provision is "vague" or "arbitrary" and
66 Prashant Reddy, Full Text of the LetterAskingfor Juslice Bhandari's Recusal from the Novartis Glivec
Dispute, Spicy IP (Sept. 8, 2011), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2011/09/ful-text-of-letter-
asking-for-justice.html.
67 Lee, supra note 4, at 299-300.
68 Id. at 299.
69 Id; Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2007 A-I-R 24759 (Madras H.C.).
70 Lee, supra note 4, at 300.
71 Id
72 Id
73 Id.; Gopakumar K.M., Product Patents and Access to Medidnes in India: A Critical Review of the
Impkmentation of TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 LAW & DEV. REv. 325, 336 (2010). See Shanunad Basheer
& Prashant Reddy, 'Ducking" TRIPS in India: A Saga Involving Novartis and the LegaiY ofSection 3(d),
20 NAT'L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 131, 140-43 (2008) (critiquing of the grounds on which the Madras
High Court made its decision in NovartisAG and providing an alternate approach to reaching the
conclusion that Indian courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether a law complies with TRIPS).
74 Lee, supra note 4, at 300-01.
75 Id. at 301.
76 NISHITH DESAI AssocIATEs, supra note 34, at 26.
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conferred uncontrolled discretion to the Patent Controller. 77 Instead, similar to
the U.S. Supreme Court requiring a mere "intelligible principle" to overcome a
non-delegation doctrine challenge,7 8 it found that the legislature routinely uses
more general terms for courts to interpret on the facts of a particular case. 79 In
any case, it found Novartis a sophisticated party capable of interpreting
technical language.80
The IPAB, a special tribunal established in 2003 to hear challenges to
rejections of patent applications, took up the issue of the patent office's
rejection of the Glivec patent on the merits.81 The proceedings were disrupted
by the fact that the government at first appointed S. Chandrasekharan, former
Controller of the Chennai Patent Office, to be the "technical member" of the
Chennai-based IPAB.82 Although he had not been directly involved with the
rejection of Novartis's application, his filing an affidavit defending the rejection
in later litigation raised serious questions about his impartiality.83 The IPAB
dismissed Novartis's objection to S. Chandrasekharan's participation before the
Madras High Court.84 After litigation back and forth over this matter,85
Novartis's appeal of the patent rejection on the merits was finally heard by a
special bench of the IPAB, comprising Justice Negi and Dr. P.C. Chakraborty,
the latter acting as "Technical Member," in November and December 2008.86
In June 26, 2009, the IPAB issued a decision overturning the Patent
Controller's rejection of the application based on lack of novelty and inventive
step, but upholding its findings as to Section 3(d).87 The IPAB held that "a
person skilled in the art just can not predict the polymorphism and prepare the
subject compound from the available disclosure," and therefore, the patent was
77 Lee, supra note 4, at 301-02.
78 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472, 474 (2001), availabk at http://sup
reme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/531 /457/case.pdf.
79 Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2007 A.I.R. 24759 (Madras H.C.) 14 (finding "[usling
general expressions in a Statute, leaving the court to understand it's meaning, would not be a
ground to declare a section or an Act ultra vires").
80 Lee, supra note 4, at 302.
81 Id. at 299-300.
82 Shamnad Basheer, Allegations of Bias in the Novartis Patent Litigation, SPIcY IP BLOG Gune 20,
2007, 2:32 PM), http://spicyip.com/2007/06/alegations-of-bias-in-novartis-patent.html.
83 Id.
84 Lee, supra note 4, at 303; Shamnad Basheer, Novartis Case at IPAB Stayed. . ., SPICY IP BLOG
(Aug. 10, 2007, 1:53 PM), http://spicyip.com/2007/08/Novaris-case-at-ipab-stayed.html.
85 Lee, supra note 4, at 303; Basheer, supra note 84.
86 Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit, Novartis Case: Background and Update - Supreme Court of Inia
to Recommence Hearing, LAWYERS COLLECIVE (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.lawyerscollective.org/new
s/archived-news-a-articles/1 26-novardis-case-background-and-update-supreme-court-of-india-to-rec
ommence-hearing.html.
87 Id.
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not anticipated. 88 The U.S. FDA's orange book data for imatinib mesylate were
based on Novartis's 1993 patent for imatinib in the United States, but because
these data were published after 2005, they did not predate the priority date of
the contested application. 89 Moreover, because not just any process for
converting imatinib to imatinib mesylate would inevitably lead to the beta form,
which was claimed in Novartis's rejected application, the molecule was not
inherently anticipated 90 under the American case Schering Corp. v. Geneva
Pharmaceulicals, Inc.91
On the inventive step question, IPAB held that because appellant Novartis
made a technical advance beyond existing knowledge by isolating the
polymorphism imatinib mesylate and identifying properties of the beta crystal
form that made it suitable for use in "the making of oral solid drug formulation
for curing cancer," the invention was not obvious.92  IPAB rejected
respondent's argument that since the mesylate form of imatinib falls within the
ambit of broad prior art patents, imatinib mesylate as claimed was obvious.93
Under the prior art, there were "multiple choices of free base including imatinib
and their salts" and "[n]o one [salt was] specially identified as important."94
Therefore, an "uninventive man ha[d] no [reason] to choose mesylate." 95
On Section 3(d), IPAB held that Novartis's patent application did not satisfy
the provision's requirement of enhanced efficacy, and therefore, upheld the
Patent Office's decision.96 First, IPAB found that Section 3(d) applied because
the invention fell under "drugs/pharmaceuticals/pharmacology."9 Next, the
board stated that it agreed with the definition of efficacy set forth by the
Madras High Court as requiring a "therapeutic effect in healing a disease or
having a good effect on the body."98 It found it impossible to "quantify this
term by any general formula" because what Section 3(d) requires could "vary
from case to case as per [the] situation." 99 However, IPAB held that (1) "bio-
88 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/
Orders/ 100-2009.htm.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
92 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/
Orders/100-2009.htm.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.; Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit, supra note 86.
97 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/
Orders/100-2009.htm; NISHITH DESAI ASSOCIATES, supra note 34, at 21-22.
98 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.m.nic.in/
Orders/100-2009.htm.
99 Id
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availability.is not the same as therapeutic efficacy" and (2) Appellant cannot
create its own meaning of efficacy.100 Since imatinib mesylate merely claimed a
30% increase in bio-availability over the prior art, IPAB held that Novartis had
failed to establish enhanced efficacy. 01
Following IPAB's order, Novartis appealed to the Indian Supreme Court by
filing a special leave petition challenging IPAB's interpretation of Section 3(d)
and its application in this case.' 02 Respondents filed cross-petitions challenging
IPAB's holdings on novelty and inventive step. 0 3 The Supreme Court began
hearing final arguments on August 9, 2011.104 A decision was expected since
November 2012 and finally came out on April 1, 2013.10
III. DOES EVERGREENING OCCUR IN INDIA?
As the stated purpose of Section 3(d) is to prevent evergreening, a dissection
of different theories of evergreening and exposition of whether evergreening
occurs in India are key to analyzing Section 3(d). The meaning of evergreening
is extremely fraught. Evergreening has been explained to the lay public by
groups like MSF as a way for MNCs to disguise a drug that has already received
a patent in order to receive a "secondary patent" on an allegedly new drug that
restarts the twenty year period of exclusivity anew. 10 6 Through videos and
infographics, evergreening is portrayed as an artifice to patent a so-called
"improvement" on a drug, even though that improvement is minimal.107 The
truth, however, is much more complicated, and inaccurate statements on the
subject are surprisingly common.
Thus, this part of the Article answers the question: Does evergreening, the
intended target of Section 3(d), occur as it is frequently articulated-that is, as a
persistent, pernicious practice bordering on defrauding the public? If not, then
what occurs in reality?
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit, supra note 86.
103 Id.
104 Id
105 See Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India), available at http://suprem
ecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf; George, supra note 2; Kulkarni, supra note 2; Sharma,
supra note 2.
106 How Does Evergeening Restict Access to Medcdnes?, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, http://aids20
12.msf.org/2012/the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-evergreening/ (last visited May 24, 2014);
Everrening' Dmgs: An Attack on Access to Me&dnes, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERIEs (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/evergreening-drugs-attack-access-medicines.
107 How Does Evergreening RestrictAccess to Medicines?, supra note 106; Eveqgreening' Drugs: An Attack on
Access to Medicines, supra note 106.
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The short answer is that what pharmaceutical companies do that could
conceivably be called evergreening is not necessarily harmful to society. While
pharmaceutical patents are used to extend monopolies over drugs, secondary
patents, like the one sought for imatinib mesylate, frequently cover the only
pharmaceutically usable form of the drug known-the very innovation that the
patent system means to incentivize. 08 An interpretation of Section 3(d) that
chills such incremental, but critical innovation, may do more harm than good.
A. UNSOUND THEORIES OF EVERGREENING
Where evergreening has been described as re-patenting identical subject
matter during the life of a preexisting patent, evergreening does not occur. The
Indian Patent Office prohibits such patents by requiring an "inventive step"
and "novelty" for all new patents.' 09 Gowree Gokhale, the head of the
Intellectual Property group at Nishith Desai Associates, stated simply that "If a
second drug had identical properties and claims, it would be obvious, and the patent
office would not grant a patent on it. There would be no controversy. The
question is whether certain additional improvements are enough to get another
patent.,,110
Indian patent law also precludes patenting a reformulation of a drug that
would permit the extension of the term of the original patent."' Once a patent
is expired, a generic version may be produced. Tapan Ray stated in an interview
that "Patent expiration is a legal process. There is no way that a drug company
can simply ignore it or override it, so of course a generic entity may [begin
producing it]. ' 112 Articles stating that "[e]ver-greening would... allow[] a
patent holder, nearing the end of the 20-year life of a patent, to renew the
108 See infra note 118 (citing Valeant Int'l (Barbados) SRL v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 10-
10526-CIV-MORENO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128742, at *4-5, *33 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011),
affd sub noma. Valeant Int'l Berm. v. Actavis, Inc., 534 Fed. App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (upholding
patents covering Aplenzin®, a second-generation successor to Wellbutrin®, because of the drug's
unexpected increase in stability and shelf-life); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075,
1080-81 (Fed. Cit. 2008) (upholding validity of patent for Plavix® claiming isomer of prior art
compound because of unexpected improvements as to favorable antiplatelet activity and the
unfavorable neurotoxicity)).
109 Indian Supreme Court opinion at p. 40 (quoting Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act
No. 38 of 2002), Section 20)0)) ("invention" means "a new product or process involving an
inventive step and capable of industrial application').
110 Interview with Gowree Gokhale, Intel. Prop. Attorney (Jan. 17, 2013) (emphasis added).
111 See D.P.S. Parmar, Legislaive Framework of IP Administrafion, OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER
GENERAL OF PATENTS, DESIGNS & TRADE MARKS, at 10-11, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdo
cs/sme/en/wipo-smes -del_08/wi posmes del_08_www-1 1 6733-part2.ppt.
112 Interview with Tapan Ray, supra note 28.
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patent for a fresh 20-year period"113 are not just misleading, but incorrect.
Even if evergreening is occurring in some sense, it is not occurring through the
renewal of a preexisting patent.
A third, more plausible, theory of evergreening is that by deliberately
staggering patent applications, pharmaceutical companies can patent different
aspects of a single drug to preclude the production of the drug after the
expiration of the original patent. Several scholars have cited this definition of
evergreening, using vague examples without demonstrating how this is done.11 4
In fact, a later patent on the packaging of a particular patented drug would not
prevent generic companies from selling the drug in different packaging after the
expiration of the patent on the drug itself. Even if some aspect of the
commercial drug itself, such as the capsule, were patented, generic companies
would be free to create a different capsule for a generic version after the drug
patent expired. Furthermore, a drug company cannot simply postpone
obtaining a patent on a new aspect of the drug, dose, or packaging if it has
already been using that drug, dose or packaging commercially. Under Indian
patent law, as under U.S. patent law, inventors cannot patent an invention that
"was publicly known or publicly used in India before the priority date of that
claim." 15 If the drug company claims an earlier priority date to prevent its
earlier invention from being considered prior art, it cannot also obtain an expiry
on the term of the patent later than the earlier invention's. Simply stated, the
term of a patent is based on the priority date.
A last theory of evergreening is that pharmaceutical companies patent a new
commercial embodiment of a drug, say, "version 2.0," when it is no better than
the original commercial embodiment of the drug, "version 1.0," with the
intention of forcing patients to pay on-patent prices beyond the life of the first
patent. However, this theory, too, lacks merit. If version 2.0 were no better
than version 1.0, there would be no reason for patients to demand version 2.0
when version 1.0 goes off-patent. In fact, not only should the demand for
version 2.0 be no higher than for version 1.0, but after version 1.0's patent
expires, demand for version 1.0 should be much higher due to the entrance of
generic competitors into the market. Continued high demand for a newer
113 Mueller, supra note 8, at 550 n.356 (quoting Better Now, But.. ., Bus. STANDARD (Mar. 24, 2005),
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/letters-now-but-105032401068 .html).
114 Basheer & Reddy, supra note 73, at 136 n.17; Mueller, supra note 8, at 551 n.357; Timothy
Bazzle, Note, Pharmafy of the Developing World: Recondling Intellectual Property Rights in India with the
Right to Health: TRIPS, India's Patent System and Essential Medicines, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 785, 802
(2011) (describing the "pernicious practice of 'evergreening' pharmaceutical patents, a process
whereby drug companies artificially extend their period of patent exclusivity by patenting trivial
secondary elements of their patented drug when the underlying patent is set to expire").
115 The Patents Act, 1970 § 25(1)(d), No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (1993), available at http://
Indiacode.nic.in.
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iteration in spite of the availability of the old version at an off-patent price is
probative of the new version's enhanced efficacy, in a broad sense of the term.
It is true that high demand for a reformulation of a drug does not necessarily
prove enhanced efficacy. If it is less expensive for a drug company to generate
hype for a new version of a drug that lacks enhanced efficacy than it is to
develop a genuine innovation over the prior art, the company has strong
incentives to patent the new version and deceive health care providers and
patients into buying it at on-patent prices. The commercial success of "me-too
drugs" that are no better than drugs already on the market is well-documented
in the United States context.n 6 Still, this seems less likely to occur in India
because the average Indian consumer is much more price-sensitive than the
average consumer in a developed country when it comes to on-patent drugs.1n 7
As described in Part II, most patients in India must pay out of pocket for drugs.
There is the possibility that patients would be more willing to pay for drugs that
they believe will be more effective for treating life-threatening diseases like
AIDS or cancer. However, this would probably only comprise a small set of
cases, and the parties currently opposing Novartis are not making the argument
that Glivec is not more effective than other leukemia drugs and should not be
sold at all.
B. EVERGREENING AS IT OCCURS IN INDIA
In contrast to the misbegotten theories described above, what does happen in
pharmaceutical patenting is that a drug company can obtain a secondary patent
on a later iteration of the drug, including the commercial formulation of the
drug, after patenting the raw active molecule at an earlier stage of drug
development. 1 8 As explained above, such a secondary patent will not prevent
generic drug companies from using the earlier iteration of the drug, including
the active molecule if that is what was patented, when that iteration's patent
116 Scott Hensley, Should FDA Hold Me-Too' Drugs to a Higher Standard?, NPR SHOTS (Feb. 15,
2011, 5:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/02/17/133784085/should-fda-hold-me-t
oo-drugs-to-a-higher-standard/. But see Thomas H. Lee, 'Me-too" Produts-Friend or Foe?, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 211, 211-12 (2004) (arguing that so-called "me-too" products actually enhance
competition and offer better value alternatives in the market for a particular class of drug).
117 See Bazzle, supra note 114, at 808-09.
118 See, e.g., Valeant Int'l (Barbados) SRL v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 10-20526-CIV-
MORENO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128742, at *4-5, *29, *32 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011), affd sub
nom. Valeant Int'l Berm v. Actavis, Inc., 534 F. App'x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (upholding a patent on
buproprion hydrobromide as valid over the prior art, including bupropion hydrochloride and a
prior patent on buproprion).
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expires.1n 9 Thus if the newer version for the drug is not a true improvement
over the version originally patented, it is in the interest of generic companies to
manufacture and sell the older version because patients should be indifferent
between the inexpensive expired and expensive on-patent versions. The one
time secondary patents would evergreen, or delay the entrance of important
generics into the market is, ironically, when the modified version is better than
the original, as demonstrated by high patient demand.
IV. WHAT IS ENHANCED EFFICACY?
The meaning of enhanced efficacy is the central issue in Novartis AG.120 As
explained below, the Indian Supreme Court in Novartis AG chose among three
different interpretations of enhanced efficacy. The first interpretation is that
enhanced efficacy is subsumed completely within India's "inventive step" and
"industrial application" requirements. In India, as well as the EU, inventive
step roughly approximates non-obviousness in the United States; and industrial
application, utility in the United States.121 The second interpretation is that
enhanced efficacy refers broadly to any improvements on the functioning of a
pharmaceutical as a treatment. The third is that enhanced efficacy means
therapeutic efficacy only, as narrowly defined by the Madras High Court and
the IPAB. Each interpretation has its own attendant consequences for
evergreening, public health, and innovation, and there are tradeoffs to each.
A. INVENTIVE STEP OR INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION REQUIREMENT
One interpretation of Section 3(d)'s enhanced efficacy requirement is that it
is merely a rearticulation of the inventive step or industrial application
requirement in the context of pharmaceutical product patents.
Section 3(d) would be least likely to contravene TRIPS Article 27.1 under
this interpretation of enhanced efficacy. Inventive step and industrial
119 As a simple example, a patent on cell phones would not extend the protection of U.S. Patent
No. 174,465, Alexander Graham Bell's expired patent on phones. The cell phone patent would
only prevent people from making or using phones if the phones were cell phones.
120 Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 56 (India), availabk athttp://suprem
eecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf (explaining that "[w]e are clearly of the view that the
importance of... 3(d) ... cannot be under-estimated," and discussing whether the claimed subject
matter fulfills the "enhanced efficacy" requirement at length).
121 See Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 29 (India), available at http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf ("For the purposes of this Article, the terms
'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a Member to be
synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively.").
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application are already required in India as a result of TRIPS Article 27.1.122
According to Section 2(1)(j) of the 1970 Act, an "invention" is by definition a
new product or process that involves an inventive step and is capable of
industrial application. 123
Most of the practitioners interviewed for this Article believe Section 3(d) to
be no- more than an explanation of the inventive step or industrial application
requirement in the field of pharmaceutical products. Thus, Section 3(d) is
essentially not an enhanced efficacy requirement and does not add any
additional barrier to patentability. For example, one interviewee, Aditi Jha,
stated that she sees Section 3(d) as "just another form of saying that something
is non-obvious in a more concrete way." 124  In her view, "the patent office
could just demand higher efficacy [to obtain a secondary patent] even without
Section 3(d). I don't think Section 3(d) realy makes a differene."'125 In other words,
the inventive step and industrial application requirements themselves require
some level of increased efficacy above the prior art in order to obtain a patent.
According to Jha, Section 3(d) was written into the 2005 Amendment for
primarily political reasons-the legislature was eager to mollify a constituency
skeptical of the new provisions of the 2005 Amendment permitting
pharmaceutical product patents. 26 Generic manufacturers and some patient
groups feared that the 2005 Amendment, without a qualifying provision, would
give rise to an onslaught of patents that would destroy Indian generic
manufacturers' business model of reverse engineering innovative drugs.127
Another interviewee, Leena Menghaney of Doctors Without Borders, shared
a similar view that Section 3(d) is part and parcel of India's inventive step or
non-obviousness standard. She believed, however, that Section 3(d) does real
work by ensuring non-obviousness is strictly enforced on pharmaceutical
product patent applications. 128 According to Menghaney, "A lot of the
developing countries blindly grant whatever developed countries grant. They
don't look closely enough at the prior art to examine what is obvious. 129
However, she too does not believe that Section 3(d) imposes an additional
122 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
123 Ranjan Matthew, Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan, Patentab#'* Requirements in India (2011), http://
www.lakshmisri.com/Uploads/MediaTypes/Documents/L&SWebsite IPRFeaturedRanjan.pdf.
124 Interview with AditiJha, Patent Attorney (Jan. 8, 2013).
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 Id.
127 See Rai, supra note 44, at 77-78 (noting that the local Indian pharmaceutical industry has not
yet reached the stage where it can discover or develop new chemical entities).
128 Interview of Leena Menghaney, Advocate from Doctors Without Borders in New Delhi
(Jan. 24, 2013) ("Patent offices in India should consider this a clear signal that the law should be
strictly applied, and frivolous patent applications should be rejected.").
129 Id.
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barrier unique to pharmaceutical products.130 Rather, Section 3(d) merely
ensures that India's overextended patent examiners' 3 1 do not cursorily gloss
over the inventive step requirement for complex chemical inventions.132
What Jha, Menghaney, and other practitioners may be implying is that
Section 3(d) creates a doctrine analogous to the United States' "obvious to try"
doctrine that has experienced recent revival in cases like KSR v. Teleflex, Exparte
Kubin, and Pfizer v. Apotx.133 If we assume that U.S. patent law is consistent
with TRIPS, which I recognize is itself an assumption for the sake of
argument, 34 then Section 3(d) can be construed as consistent with TRIPS by
analogy. Although KSR was about a mechanical and electronic device, not a
pharmaceutical, it nevertheless shifted the overall tone of the courts towards
using "obvious to try" to supplement the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation
test."'135 In KSR, the U.S. Supreme Court commented that the Federal Circuit
had "conclude[d] in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely
by showing that the combination of elements was 'obvious to try.'"136
Following KSR, the court in Pfizer v. Apotex found a patent obvious because the
prior art had already narrowed down the potential combinations for an effective
drug to fifty-three besylates. 137 Further, in Exparte Kubin, a biotechnology case,
the Patent Board reaffirmed the use of obvious to try, citing KSR.138 Under the
"obvious to try" test, if the prior art narrows down a finite set of particular and
predictable combinations that are obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the
art to try, then those combinations fail the non-obviousness requirement. 139
Section 3(d) could merely embody a legislative judgment that a reformulation or
"slight" modification of a chemical compound is per se obvious to try.140
130 Id.
131 See INNOVACCER, OPERATIONAL ISSUES AT IP INDIA OFFICE: A BRIEF REPORT 2-4 (2011),
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Discusspaper/feedback3lCGPDTMInnovaccer_1 6December20l1.
pdf.
132 Id. at 186.
133 Andrew V. Trask, 'Obvious To T".- A Proper Patentabiliy Standard in the PharmaceuticalArts?, 76
FORDHAM L. REv. 2625 (2008), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss5/9.
134 Linda Lee made a similar assumption in her article: "Assuming that the patent laws of other
countries are TRIPS-compliant and absent WTO ruling on the contrary, Novartis has likely
overstated the noncompliance of Section 3(d)." Lee, supra note 4, at 309.
135 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
136 Trask, supra note 133, at 2647 (alteration in original) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421).
137 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364-69 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
138 Trask, supra note 133, at 2658.
139 See id. at 2658-59.
140 If Section 3(d) is a per se obvious to try rule, I believe that it is grossly overinclusive and
creates a danger of too many Type I errors. While there were only fifty-three reasonably possible
pharmaceutically-acceptable salts in Pfizer, there could be hundreds or thousands in other cases,
with no suggestion in the prior art of which would be therapeutically effective.
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As for Section 3(d) being an elaboration of industrial application in the
pharmaceutical sphere, Aditi Jha thinks Section 3(d) "is meant to prevent the
patenting of stereoisomers that were accidentally discovered."'141 In her view,
"the provision simply requires that the isomer actually does something.' 42 In
other words, Section 3(d) is India's answer to the specific utility or substantial
utility requirement that constitutes one requirement of Section 101 in the
United States.143 Like specific utility or substantial utility in the United States,
Section 3(d) may simply require that patent applicants state a sufficiently well-
defined use for the new drug or demonstrate a real-world benefit to the public
at the time of filing, respectively.
B. MORE THAN INVENTIVE STEP AND INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION
Alternatively, the Indian Supreme Court in Novartis AG could have found,
as the lower courts did, that Section 3(d)'s enhanced efficacy requirement
demands more than on inventive step and industrial application to obtain a
pharmaceutical product patent. I first argue that under any such interpretation
of enhanced efficacy, Section 3(d) is not TRIPS compliant. I then present
arguments for and against an additional enhanced efficacy requirement,
generally. Next, I argue for and against a further restriction of the enhanced
efficacy requirement to a narrow therapeutic efficacy requirement. Finally, I
critique India's use of patent law theory to justify actions much more consistent
with a "social welfare" theory, which I will explain.
1. Noncompliance With TRIPS. The Indian Supreme Court has interpreted
enhanced efficacy in Section 3(d) to mean medically significant efficacy that is
fundamentally different from the inventive step and industrial application
requirements. 1" This interpretation departs from U.S. conceptions of
pharmaceutical patent protection.145 If the U.S. is assumed to be a good
benchmark of compliance with TRIPS, 146 then by creating an additional barrier
141 Interview with AditiJha, supra note 124.
142 Id.
143 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("useful"); MPEP Section 2107, availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s2107.html ("A claimed invention must have a specific and substantial utility.
This requirement excludes 'throw-away,' 'insubstantial,' or 'nonspecific' utilities, such as the use
of a complex invention as landfill, as a way of satisfying the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C.
101."); see also supra note 121.
144 Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 11 (India), available at http://supre
mecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf (finding that "section 3(d) clearly sets up a second tier
of qualifying standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products" and "no force in
[Novartis's] submission that section 3(d) is a provision ex majore cauteld').
145 See infra text accompanying notes 155-72.
146 See supra text accompanying note 133.
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to patenting drugs, Section 3(d) contravenes TRIPS. This conclusion is based
on past TRIPS adjudications, the plain language of Article 27.1, WTO
jurisprudence, interviews, and the literature.
The plain language of Article 27.1 is ambiguous, but if anything, it suggests
that inventive step, industrial application, and novelty are to be the only
requirements for patentability.147  As stated above, the first part of TRIPS
Article 27.1 says that patents shall be available in "all fields" of technology if
they are "new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application." 148  According to a well-known semantic canon of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit mention of items in a
list gives rise to an inference that all other items are excluded. 49 Logical
reasoning about the nature and purpose of TRIPS leads to the same conclusion.
If TRIPS was meant to guarantee Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) or at least
minimum IPRs in all members of the WTO, especially developing countries
that lacked such rights, then to allow such countries to append additional
requirements onto the list of requirements set forth by TRIPS would render the
provisiorn a nullity. A developing country could circumvent the spirit of TRIPS
by simply erecting extra barriers to patenting wherever it believed it would
benefit. The second part of Article 27.1, the non-discrimination clause, only
strengthens the argument that Section 3(d) violates TRIPS by clarifying that the
named requirements should not be applied differently to different fields of
technology. 5 0
WTO jurisprudence does not settle the question of compliance in Novartis
AG. Canada Pharmaceuticals, the key non-discrimination case described in Part
II.C, can be distinguished from Novartis AG. Whereas Canada's stockpiling
exception applied by statute to patents of all types and not necessarily merely to
pharmaceutical patents,15 1 Section 3(d) clearly singles out pharmaceutical
patents for special treatment on its face. It is hard to argue that Section 3(d)
does not sanction de jure discrimination against such patents. Moreover,
although the decision found that some discrimination may be permitted for bona
fide reasons, the dispute resolution panel was careful to suggest that facts more
extreme than those in that case could cross the non-discrimination line. The
147 U.S. industry adopts this view. See Dean, supra note 22, at 735; Sampat, Shadlen & Amin,
supra note 3, at 414.
148 See spra text accompanying note 38 (quoting TRIPS Article 27.1).
149 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 393 Mich. 432, 436, 225 N.W.2d 165, 166 (1975); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 723, 726 (1986) (finding that explicit grant of power to Congress to remove an
officer of the United States by impeachment gives rise to negative implication that Congress
cannot remove such an officer by other methods).
150 See stora ,xt accompanying note 38 (quoting TRIPS Article 27.1).
151 Stout, _pra note 41, at 187.
[Vol. 21:223
24
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss2/2
NOVARTIS AG V. UNION OF INDIA
panel emphasized the importance of ensuring that member governments do not
abuse the "bona fide reason" loophole to "limit exceptions to areas where right
holders tend to be foreign producers."'15 2
Throughout Novarlis AG, the courts on every level have invoked the
importance of the generic drug industry to India's economy, which raised the
question of whether Section 3(d) is being used prejudicially against
pharmaceutical patent holders, which tend to be foreign MNCs.153 Interviewee
Khushboo Baxi explained that her law firm's research suggests that the courts
in Novartis AG have "listened more to the Indian drug market than to the other
side" and that "NGOs, legal aid societies put pressure on the courts" to
consider "the survival of the generics industry."'154 On these facts, Section 3(d)
may violate the spirit of Article 27.1 to promote free and fair trade if it is
interpreted so strictly as to preclude the patenting of a large portion of
pharmaceutical drugs that foreign companies apply for, to the benefit of generic
drug manufacturers.
In addition, Section 3(d)'s enhanced efficacy requirement for pharmaceutical
patents is fundamentally different than limitations found in U.S. jurisprudence,
yet popularly cited papers have drawn analogies to U.S. jurisprudence to defend
Section 3(d). For example, while Linda Lee concedes that the efficacy
requirement "has no explicit parallel in any other patent regime in the world,"'5 5
she argues that "because other countries have taken more indirect routes to
achieve similar objectives, Section 3(d) is not a radical departure from
international practices.' 1s6 In other words, she believes that Section 3(d) creates
no more of a loophole to TRIPS compliance than other countries' patent
doctrines. The examples from the United States that she uses, however, do not
support her thesis, particularly after the IPAB decision, which addressed some
of them directly.
One doctrine Lee points to is the doctrine of inherent anticipation, which
U.S. courts have used to invalidate a patent on derivatives of known substances
152 Id. at 186.
153 Early in its decision, the Supreme Court of the India refers to sections of the IPAB and Madras
High Court decisions in Norvartis focusing on "the object which [section 3(d)] wanted to achieve
namely... to provide easy access to the citizens of the country to life saving drugs" and "the pricing
of the drug Gleevee by the appellant." Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at
11 (India), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf. The Court further
states after extensive analysis of the history and purposes of Section 3(d) that it "expressed its
bewilderment over the price of the drug." Id at 49 n.1. See general#y More Foreigners than In&ans
Receiving Patents in Inda, ECON. TFIMES (May 22, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://ardes.economictimes.india
times.com/2011-05-22/news/29571273_patents-act-patent-protection-utility-models.
154 Interview with Khushboo Baxi, Intell. Prop. Attorney (Jan. 23, 2013).
155 Lee, supra note 4, at 305.
156 Id. at 304.
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in Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.157  In that case, however, the
claimed metabolite was "necessarily and inevitably" formed by the human body
upon ingestion of a prior art substance. 58 The IPAB in NovartisAG specifically
addressed the respondents' inherent anticipation argument and found that there
are no prior art documents describing a method that inevitably and inherently
produces the beta form of imatinib in even trace amounts. 159 Moreover, the
imatinib mesylate claimed in the rejected application is of the purified
compound, not a mixture in which the beta form is present in trace amounts. 160
Lee also argued that U.S. courts have rejected the patenting of derivatives
under the double patenting doctrine, which prohibits patentees from ownership
of more than one patent with claims to the same invention or obvious
modifications of the invention. 61 The doctrine has both a statutory and a
common law basis. Statutory double patenting comes from the language of 35
U.S.C. 5 101, which says that an inventor may obtain "a" patent for his or her
invention' 2-not multiple patents. Statutory double patenting is inapposite to
an ordinary Section 3(d) case, such as Novartis AG, because it requires
conflicting claims to be exactly coextensive in scope.' 63  An application
attempting to patent a particular acid addition salt of a previously patented free
base, in this case imatinib mesylate, is not claiming the same exact subject
matter.
Non-statutory double patenting is also distinguishable from Section 3(d),
even though that doctrine, like Section 3(d), was designed with the public policy
purpose to prevent "an improper extension of the patent rights due to the
unexpired second patent."' 64 Nonstatutory double patenting prevents a patent
owner from obtaining a second patent with claims 'not patentably distinct' from
the claims of an earlier patent, whether because the later claims are obvious
over or anticipated by the earlier claim. 165 Obviousness type double patenting
(OTDP) basically applies ordinary 35 U.S.C. 5 103 non-obviousness analysis
except that the court compares the patentee's later claims with its earlier claims,
157 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
158 Lee, sepra note 4, at 306.
159 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.
in/Orders/1 00-2009.htm.
160 Id.
161 Lee, supra note 4, at 306.
162 Id. at 306 n.191.
163 Arnold B. Silverman, Double Patenting--One Patentper Invention, 48 JOM 67, 67 (1996), available
at http:/ /www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9606.html.
164 Id. See also Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1297 (Fed. Cit. 2012); In re
Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cit. 1985).
165 Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See also Otsuka,
678 F.3d at 1297.
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rather than with all relevant prior art.166 Since the IPAB found that Novartis's
claims were not obvious in light of the prior art, including Norvartis's own prior
patents, analysis under OTDP would result in no different an outcome on the
patentability of the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate.167 Additionally,
there was no argument before the IPAB that Novartis was attempting to use a
new secondary patent to prevent the production of other forms of imatinib
claimed in the older patent.168
These illustrative examples addressing Lee's analysis demonstrate that U.S.
patent law does not require anything quite like Section 3(d) does. The fact that
Novartis was able to obtain a patent on Gleevec 169 in the United States shows
that reasonable governments applying the same laws could reach disparate
results. The point is that "U.S. law does not require evidence of advantageous
properties of a selection invention to be presented in the application."170
Although the Federal Circuit had recently raised the bar on patent applicants to
demonstrate non-obviousness with cases like Pfizer, those cases are really about
demanding the patentee to present something that (1) was new and (2) was not
reasonably expected to succeed at the time of invention.'7' In other words, the
claimed invention needs to have been produced by the inventor and be
materially different from, but not necessarily better than, the prior art. The U.S.
166 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 689 F.3d 1368, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Foley & Lardner LLP, A Look At the U.S. Doctrine of Obviousness-Tpe
Double Patenting, KLUWER PATENT BLOG (June 13, 2012), http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2012/
06/13/a-look-at-the-u-s-doctrine-of-obviousness-type-double-patenting/.
167 See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding
OTDP inquiry "subsumed by the broader statutory inquiry pursuit to 35 U.S.C. § 103" where
OTDP prior patent is part of the prior art).
168 See Brinckerhoff, supra note 166 (explaining the application of OTDP to prevent patents that
preempt the public use of previously claimed inventions).
169 "Gleevec" is the commercial name of Glivec in the United States, http://www.gleevec.
com/index.jsp (for U.S. residents only); FDA Orange Book online's page for patent and market
exclusivity information for Gleevec, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/pat
exclnew.cfm?ApplNo=021588&ProductNo=001&tablel=OBRx. One of the U.S. patent
applications covering Gleevec that the Indian Supreme Court points as similar to the Indian
patent application at issue is U.S. Patent App. No. 09/463,097, issued as U.S. Patent No.
6,894,051.
170 Selection Inventions - the Inventive Step Requirement, Other Patentability Criteria and Scope of Protec6on,
AIPPI (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.aippi-us.org/images/GR209usa.pdf.
171 See Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10710, at *30-31 (Fed. Cir. June 10,
2014) ("A single prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed
invention if such feature is necessarily present, or inherent, in that reference."); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[O]bviousness cannot be avoided simply by
a showing of some degree of unpredictability... so long as there was a reasonable probability of
success.').
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patent system made the per se judgment that the USPTO is not the correct
forum for deciding whether a patent is benefidal over a decade ago.l7 2
The Swiss government has publicly stated that it does not intend to bring
the case before the WTO DSB against India if Novartis loses its appeal.17 3
Some interviewees, including Aditi Nadkarni and Dr. Milind Antani, speculated
that this suggests that the government itself views Novartis's case as weak.17 4
Still, this Article provides analysis that demonstrates that the Swiss government
would have a colorable case against India in the DSB under the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Section 3(d) as demanding more than ordinary
inventive step and industrial application.
2. Anaysis of an Addiional Enhanced Efficagy Requirement Generaly. Despite non-
compliance with TRIPS, the Supreme Court has adopted an interpretation of
Section 3(d) that demands more than inventive step and industrial application.
The main benefit of requiring enhanced efficacy is straightforward-although it
would have no effect on promoting access to generic medicines for the reasons
described in Part III, Section 3(d) would keep out patents on useless and relatively
harmless products 75 Alternatively, to the extent that the theory of evergreening
as patenting and creating demand for a useless version 2.0 of a drug on the
market happens in some cases, Section 3(d) could have some measurable effect
on promoting access to generic medicines by preventing the practice.
However, an enhanced efficacy requirement does create the possibility of
blocking the patenting of genuine innovation. Gowree Gokhale sums up the
problem: "The issue the pharmaceutical industry is currently facing is that it is
difficult to demonstrate 'enhanced efficacy' at the time of patenting, even if the
reformulated products in fact possess enhanced efficacy."' 1 6 The Madras High
Court's opinion seems to assume that it would be easy to procure efficacy data,
if enhanced efficacy exists. 77 If the patent office and courts decide, post-
Supreme Court decision, that Section 3(d) demands proof of efficacy in the
regulatory sense-that is, statistically significant clinical trials demonstrating
efficacy-at the time of patenting, then many efficacious drugs may fail under
172 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (holding that the
"beneficial utility" requirement has become obsolete).
173 Basheer & Reddy, supra note 73, at 138 n.25 (citing Swiss Govt Not to Take Novartis Case to
IWTO, Bus. STANDARD (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/swiss-govt-not-to-take-novaris-case-to-wto-1 07080801003 1.html).
174 Interview with Aditi Nadkarni, Attorney (Jan. 17, 2013); Interview with Dr. Milind Antani,
Intell. Prop. Attorney (Jan. 8, 2013).
175 But see supra Part III.B.
176 Interview with Gowree Gokhale, supra note 110.
177 See Sharmnad Basheer & T. Prashant Reddy, The 'Efficagy" of Indan Patent Law: Ironing out the
Creases in Section 3(d), 5 SCRIPTED 232, 255 (2008).
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Section 3(d).178 Pharmaceutical companies typically seek patents up to several
years before they are able to sell a commercially viable drug.t79 A patent
provides the incentive to perform the clinical trials to get efficacy data by (1)
guaranteeing the drug company a right to exclude others from exploiting the
eventual fruits of its labor' 80 and (2) protecting companies from having their
own clinical data used as prior art against their future patent applications. 81 If
the Supreme Court requires a high level of proof of efficacy too early in the
long and arduous 182 process of drug development, it might put the cart before
the horse.183
Still, the potential for incidental exclusion of secondary products with
enhanced efficacy would not be impossible to cure. Patent attorney A.C.
suggested in his interview that Section 59 of the 1970 Act as Substituted by Act
38 of 72002, provides for amending an incomplete specification, such that the
specification as amended can contain additional statistics and information about
a pharmaceutical compound claimed in the original application. 184  This
suggests that applicants lacking sufficient proof of efficacy at the time of filing
could subsequently amend their applications to include the supporting data,
while claiming the benefit of the priority date. There would be no danger of
such an amendment enlarging the scope of the claims, because what is claimed
would unambiguously remain the chemical compound as originally claimed. 18
178 See Written Submissions, supra note 63, at 15-16 (citing Basheer & Reddy, supra note 177, at
255-56).
179 See Basheer & Reddy, supra note 177, at 255-56.
180 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265, 276
(1977) ("Trlhe patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the
patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information
appropriable by competitors."); How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/ (last visited May 24, 2014) ("New drugs, like other new products, are frequently under patent
protection during development. The patent protects the salmon calcitonin sponsor's investment
in the drug's development by giving them the sole right to sell the drug while the patent is in
effect.").
181 See Basheer & Reddy, supra note 177, at 256.
182 Jane Larkindale, Why Does It Take So Long To Go from Mouse to Man, QUEST (Jan. 1, 2012,
3:11 PM), available at http://quest.mda.org/article/why-does-it-take-so-long-go-mouse-man ("On
average, it takes a drug about 12 years to get from discovery to market, and it costs about $1.8
billion per drug that works. Only about one drug in 10,000 actually makes it. However, due to
the rigorous processes of preclnical research, about one in five drugs that get an IND
[investigational drug application] eventually make it through trials.').
183 See Basheer & Reddy, supra note 177, at 256 (presenting an alternative proposal based on the
U.S. model for proof of efficacy that would not unduly burden pharmaceutical companies, where,
all that would be required is "a reasonable correlation between the activity and the asserted use").
184 Interview with A.C., supra note 18.
185 For example, Novartis's claim over the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate would not
change with the addition of efficacy data.
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3. Narrowing the Interpretation of Efficay to Therapeutic Efficagy Only. If the true
purpose of Section 3(d) is to separate minor modifications from genuine
innovation, as proponents of Section 3(d) claim, the Supreme Court should
have selected a broad interpretation of enhanced efficacy that blocks secondary
patents on treatments that do not improve patient outcomes while permitting
the patenting of valuable new iterations of drugs. A narrow interpretation of
enhanced efficacy would not reward innovation in accordance with patent law
theory, as generic manufacturers would be able to free-ride on innovations
created as a result of patent incentives only provided in other countries.18 6
There are frequently countless ways to try to turn an active drug molecule
into a pharmaceutically-accepted formulation, and the different ways can have
very different properties.18 7 The "secondary" product may be more stable,
more potent, less toxic, easier to administer, or cause fewer side effects, and
may even be the only commercially viable form of the drug, as in Glivec's
case. 88 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Madras High Court
and the IPAB's construction of efficacy as therapeutic efficacy only, rendering
some of these genuine improvements over prior art pharmaceuticals
unpatentable under Section 3(d).189 Modifications that improve therapeutic
efficacy by having a unique therapeutic effect on the body fulfill Section 3(d)'s
demands, while modifications improving drugs in other ways would not.190
186 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 288-89 (2003) (explaining that under the instrumental
theory of patent law, "the patent system encourages individuals to invent" and that absent a
patent system, "too few inventions [would be] made").
187 See J. Keith Guillory, Generation of Po~ymorphs, Hydrates, Solvates, and Amorphous Solids, in
POLYMORPHISM IN PHARMACEUTICAL SOLIDS 64 (Harry G. Brittain ed., 1999) (as of 1990, more
than 350 patents on crystal forms granted on the basis of an advantage in terms of stability,
formulation, solubility, bioavailability, recovery, or prevention of precipitation).
188 See, e.g., Valeant Int'l (Barbados) SRL v. Watson Pharms., Inc., No. 10-10526-CIV-
MORENO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128742, at *4-5, *33 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011), affd sub nom,.
Valeant Int'l Berm. v. Actavis, Inc., 534 F. App'x 999 (Fed. Cit. 2013) (upholding patents
covering Aplenzin®, a second-generation successor to Welbutrin®, because of the drug's
unexpected increase in stability and shelf-life); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075,
1080-81 (Fed. Cit. 2008) (upholding validity of patent for Plavix® claiming isomer of prior art
compound because of unexpected improvements as to favorable antiplateler activity and the
unfavorable neurotoxicity).
189 Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 17-18, 98-100 (India), available at
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf ("[T]he test of efficacy can only be
'therapeutic efficacy' ... we have no doubt that the 'therapeutic efficacy' of a medicine must be
judged strictly and narrowly.").
190 Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 90-92 (India), available at http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf (submitting that "efficacy is that property
intrinsic to a particular drug that determines how good an agonist the drug is" and finding that "a
mere change of form with properties inherent to that form would not" fulfill Section 3(d)'s
"enhanced efficacy" demand).
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Since this narrow interpretation of efficacy would render many tangible
improvements to drugs unpatentable, it cannot be justified on the principle of
preventing pharmaceutical companies from extending monopoly protection on
their drugs without producing valuable changes to drugs.
A different theory that justifies the distinction created between "therapeutic"
and other types of "efficacy" would be required. The theory could simply be
that India should limit pharmaceutical patenting whenever it benefits India to
do so, balancing increased access to affordable medicines and loss of incentives
to innovate, rather than the nature and extent of innovation in a patent
application. The straightforward benefit of disallowing secondary patents under
this social welfare-oriented theory is that it undeniably allows India's large
population of poor patients to access generic drugs sooner. 191
India could have altruistic social welfare reasons to block the patenting of
even genuine improvements on drugs. A patent, however innovative the
product, is still a monopoly. If the on!y commercially approved version of the
drug is the one on which the pharmaceutical company seeks a secondary patent,
granting the patent would indeed block generic companies from producing the
commercially approved drug until the secondary patent expires.192 The generic
companies would still be welcome to come up with an alternative commercially
viable option utilizing the off-patent molecule, but as interviewee Leena
Menghaney of MSF stated, "generic companies face high regulatory barriers for
making a second tablet with the same active compound inside. The moment
you do a different form to avoid the secondary patent, you are facing regulatory
barriers because now you have to show bioequivalence [to the MNC's approved
drug].' 193 Considering Indian pharmaceutical companies' current model of
reverse engineering rather than doing original research and development, few
domestic companies would be up to the challenge. 94 In the meantime, India's
large population of poor patients would be denied access to relatively
inexpensive generics.
Moreover, limiting patenting protection in India would probably have little
impact on incentives for innovation globally. Some interviewees opined that
India is too small a market for brand-name pharmaceuticals relative to the
world for India's patent policies are unlikely to have a real effect on innovation
worldwide. According to Adheesh Nargolkar, "The incentive concern won't
19' See supra Part II.B.
192 If a patent covers the commercialized product, the patentee can legally prevent others from
"making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for those purposes that product in India."
The Patents Act, 1970 § 48(a), No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (1993), availabk at http://
Indiacode.nic.in.
193 Interview with Leena Menghaney, supra note 128.
194 Mueller, supra note 8, at 516, 536-39.
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become a problem because the other countries are supporting the MNCs. The
MNCs make most of their money in developed countries."' 195 Aditi Nadkarni
adds that concerns that the United States and EU MNCs will stop
manufacturing drugs in India if Section 3(d) allows India to reverse engineer
genuine improvements are unfounded because maintaining a relationship with
Indian pharmaceutical companies is mutually beneficial. 96 For MNCs, the cost
of manufacturing in India is much lower than in developed countries. 97
Generic companies in partnerships with MINCs, in return, have an incentive not
to manufacture generic versions of drugs they are licensed to produce for
MNCs because they could be sued for breach of contract or develop a bad
reputation that could discourage repeat business. Thus, India has the
opportunity to free-ride on the innovation produced as a result of incentives
provided by other countries.
Nevertheless, limited patent protection for pharmaceuticals can pose
problems in the long run. First, other developing countries, inspired by India's
free-riding, could copy the same model. 198 In the aggregate, the lack of robust
patent systems around the world could disincentivize innovation. Second, other
interviewees, such as Gowree Gokhale and Dr. Antani, suggest that a narrow
interpretation of enhanced efficacy would have a negative effect on foreign
investment in India. 99 Even if they continue to innovate, MNCs would view
India as a less attractive trading partner or target for foreign direct investment
(FDI). A survey of MNCs and Indian pharmaceutical companies confirms that
the pharmaceutical industry in India perceives a positive relationship between a
robust IPR regime and FDI.200 Thus, investment of foreign capital required to
spur India's economy into the twenty-first century, would suffer.
Third, and relatedly, segments of India's domestic pharmaceutical industry
could be hurt by the narrow interpretation. If more efficacious drugs cannot be
patented, then innovative domestic pharmaceutical companies' incentive to create
them will naturally diminish. After all, the conventional premise of patent law
195 Interview with Adheesh Nargolkar, supra note 18.
196 Interview with Aditi Nadkarni, supra note 174.
197 David Keeling et al., McKinsey Report, Outlook on Pharma Operations, at 7, available at
file:///C:/Users/ddu/Downloads/Outlookon-pharma_operations.pdf (prices are 85% to 90%
lower in India than in the United States, and some Indian companies produce tablets at a cost of
$2 per thousand, compared to $60 that MNCs spend on average).
198 Sharma, supra note 2 ("W[Ihe judgement[sic] could be a signal to many other countries,
especially emerging economies, on the provisions they can have in their own patent law.").
199 Interview with Gowree Gokhale, supra note 110; Interview with Dr. Milind Antani, supra
note 174.
200 Rajnish Kumar Rai, Effect of the TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Propery Rights on Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 11 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 404, 419-20 (2008).
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theory is that a patent system incentivizes innovation. 20 Because the patent on
the active ingredient is typically obtained years before the commercially viable
version is ready,202 drug companies may not have enough time to recoup their
costs if they rely only on the original patent for market exclusivity. Moreover,
their ability to recoup costs would depend arbitrarily on the amount of time it
takes for them to develop the active ingredient into an administrable drug. In
fact, perversely, the greater the time and effort needed to develop the active
ingredient into the commercial drug, the shorter the time the innovating company
will have to recoup its costs. 20 3 In India, home-grown pharmaceutical companies
have just begun to develop advanced drug discovery and development
capabilities. 204 These companies would likely be disproportionately disadvantaged
compared to MNCs if India's patent system disincentivizes secondary patents in
particular because the investment required to develop subsequent or "follow-on"
innovations is likely to be smaller20 and would be precisely the type of innovation
these companies would likely be attempting to produce.4. Lack of Theoretical Transpareny About Therapeutic Efcafy Inteipretation.
Despite its flaws, a narrow interpretation of enhanced efficacy under the social
welfare theory does the most to advance India's public policy goal of increasing
access to cheap generic drugs compared to the other two interpretations. In
weighing the benefits against the costs described above, the Indian government
could find that this option is superior to both finding enhanced efficacy
subsumed under inventive step and industrial application or a broad
interpretation of enhanced efficacy.
Yet the problem remains that if the underlying purpose of Section 3(d) is to
allow India to free-ride off of follow-on innovation without instituting a system
that protects that innovation, India is not just violating TRIPS, but is also being
201 Kitch, supra note 180, at 266 ("The conventional view of the patent system [is] as a device
that enables an inventor to capture the returns from his investment in the invention... called the
reward theory.").
202 Id. at 271 ("A review of the invention case studies... shows that the first patentable
invention frequently occurs years before the first significant commercial product.").
203 Id.
204 See Mueller, supra note 8, at 532, 536-37 (explaining that India's traditionally genetic
pharmaceutical companies, such as Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., are "developing significant
independent R&D capabilities"). See, e.g., Innovating India's Pharmaceutical Industy, WIPO, http://
www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=2659 (last visited May 24, 2014) (explaining how
Dr. Reddy's became "the first private Indian pharmaceutical company to launch New Chemical
Entity (NCE) research and development" and "transform[ed] itself from a generics supplier to a
pharmaceutical innovator" by "rely[ing] on IPRs").
205 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulaive Research and Patent Law, 5
J. EcON. PERSP. 29, 34 n.9 (1991) (citing Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, Antitrust Pohit, the
Breadth of Patent Protection and the Incentive to Develop New Products, Goldman School of Pub. Policy,
Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 171, 1990).
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intellectually disingenuous by not openly professing to preclude patents on
genuine innovations. Section 3(d) has been touted as a patentability limitation
intended to prevent the patenting of "minor modifications" that do not
genuinely improve the ability of a drug to treat a disease. The provision has not
been openly justified under the social welfare theory as a way to block the
patenting of genuine improvements because the benefits to India outweigh the
costs of free-riding.
The evidence points to the social welfare theory as the true underlying
theory. As explained above, the evergreening theory cannot be the underlying
theory because it does not explain the distinction between therapeutic efficacy
and other types of improvements to drugs. Moreover, both the Indian
legislature and the courts in Novartis AG have made it clear that section 3(d)'s
central purpose is to promote access to important, life-saving generic drugs,
accords more with the social welfare theory, rather the evergreening theory,20 6
considering that medicines are unlikely to be both too important to the public
to patent and not important enough to patent.
The fact that Section 3(d) is limited to secondary patents, despite the fact
that the arguments supporting the social welfare theory apply to all
pharmaceutical patents, raises the possibility that India is purposefully
containing Section 3(d)'s scope in order to achieve its policy goals less
transparently than by banning pharmaceutical patents outright for political
reasons. Novartis's detractors may realize that openly acknowledging this
explanation would be too blatant a defiance of TRIPS and would be politically
or diplomatically damaging compared to the more appealing evergreening
theory.
I argue that India should reconcile the narrow enhanced efficacy
interpretation with the social welfare theory, if it is the true theory, by making
explicit its understanding of the social and economic costs and benefits of
pharmaceutical patents. Section 3(d)'s proponents should argue that India
should not have been required to comply with TRIPS by 2005. Mueller writes
that despite India's ten-year grace period to implement pharmaceutical product
protection, "the implementation was viewed by many as far too hasty. '207
Fiona DSouza of Khaitan Co. echoed this sentiment, stating "Like countries
should be treated alike, but India is not alike. It is still a developing country.
Even 50 years ago, it would be considered an underdeveloped country. Now, it
206 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Not only did the Supreme Court in Novaris AG
discuss the Ayyangar report cited in supra note 7 in detail, it even included tables contrasting the
number of patents applied for and owned by Indians versus foreigners from the report as an
appendix to the Court's decision. Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311 (India),
available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf.
207 Mueller, supra note 8, at 545.
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is still developing [rather than developed]. '"208 Despite the ten-year grace
period, about one third of India's population is still living in poverty, and
improvements in public health conditions have been marked by great disparities
between the rich and poor.209
Some regions are particularly affected by inequality .... [H]ealth
inequities have been most marked in the countries where
economic growth has been particularly inequitable. For example,
in India, where the annual per capita growth rate has hovered
around 8% for the last decade, use of antenatal care services
increased by 12% from 1996 to 2008, but only 0.1% among the
poor. At the same time, 37% of the population is living in
poverty (in some states, over 50% of the population). The
conclusion can only be that economic growth may be necessary,
but not sufficient for improving the health of all.210
The result of this has been to create a greater disparity between
those lifted 'above the poverty line' and those left behind (8).211
Still, Reichman states that "[D]ifferent countries at different stages of
economic development must accordingly strike their own balance between
incentives to create and the benefits of free competition, while respecting the
normative guidelines established by the TRIPS Agreement." 212
India made the decision to sign onto TRIPS in order to join the WTO.213
Presumably it performed some cost-benefit analysis, weighing the public health
needs of its population and the importance of the generics industry to its
economy against the free trade benefits it would gain by joining the WTO. If
India's agreement to TRIPS was freely made, then India should either comply
with TRIPS or attempt to renegotiate the terms.
208 Interview with Fiona DSouza, Patent Attorney (Jan. 15, 2013).
209 Sarah Thomsen et al., Binging Evidence to Pokiy to Achieve Health-Related MDGs for All
Justification and Design of the EPI-4 Project in China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, PMC UN NATIONAL
LIBRARY OF MEDICINE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 2, 7 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3597775/pdf/GHA-6-19650.pdf (for the approximately one third of
India's population living in poverty, the country's achievement of public health goals has been
marked by persistent and even growing inequality).
210 Id. at 2.
211 Id
212 J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
335, 337 (1997).
213 See supra note 10.
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V. NOVARTISAG: PATENTABILITY DEPENDS ON INTERPRETATION OF
ENHANCED EFFICACY
A. IPAB'S INTERPRETATION OF ENHANCED EFFICACY
IPAB arrived at its conclusion that the imatinib mesylate application failed
Section 3(d) based on three weak arguments that I will rebut in turn.. First,
rather than looking into the legislative intent and history behind the use of the
term efficacy, IPAB overly relied on the definition of efficacy found in
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary (Dorland's), which respondents
offered as evidence.2 14 Dorland's states that efficacy is "the ability of a drug to
produce the desired therapeutic effect.., independent of potency."215 On this
basis, the board concluded that enhanced efficacy cannot merely be a change in
the amount or dosage needed to treat the illness, but rather, requires something
they call therapeutic efficacy, which they left undefined.216 In this way, the
board read the qualifier "therapeutic" into the statute. Nowhere does the plain
language of the statute suggest a narrowing of the term "efficacy" from its
ordinary meaning.
Second, IPAB treated its conclusion that "bio-availability and therapeutic
efficacy are not the same" 217 as determinative of whether the increased bio-
availability offered by the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate fulfills the
requirement of therapeutic efficacy. However, its conclusion relies on too
simplistic a conception of the relationship between bio-availability and
therapeutic effect. Whether the two are the "same thing" is irrelevant.
Although increased bio-availability alone is not always sufficient to lead to
increased therapeutic effect, it can be a contributing cause towards achieving
increased therapeutic effect. In other words, changes in bioavailability can have
clinical significance. If a substance already has therapeutic effect, increasing its
bio-availability would of course enhance its therapeutic effect if all else is held
equal. Enhanced therapeutic efficacy can follow naturally from enhanced bio-
availability. In fact, many potential drug candidates have failed to be developed
as a result of problems with bioavailability. 218 In such cases, an increase in bio-
214 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), availabk at http://www.ipal.tn.nic.in/
Orders/100-2009.htm.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 The program announcement for an NIH grant: Factors That Determine Therapeutic Drug
Bioavailability, NIH GUIDE, Volume 23, Number 35, September 30, 1994, PA-95-001, available at
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-95-001.html ("Many potential drug candidates
have failed as a result of difficulties in penetrating barriers or not arriving or remaining in active form
at the site of action."). See, e.g., C. Godugu et al., Approaches to Improve the Oral Bioavailability
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availability that enables the compound to be used pharmaceutically undeniably
enhances therapeutic efficacy. Thus, IPAB's dismissal of bio-availability as
evidence of enhanced therapeutic efficacy was too facile.
Third, IPAB's order seems to stem from its fear that an inventor could use a
broad definition of efficacy in order to patent different dosages of the same
essential drug by claiming that using a higher dose causes the drug to have
enhanced efficacy.219 Yet, the facts of the instant case are far from this
imagined stratagem.
Here, Novartis is effectively claiming that a lower amount of the drug would
have the same therapeutic effect.220 The patent application does not claim that
the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate is more effective than imatinib
free base because it contains a higher concentration of the active molecule; the
patent claims a salt, not an amount or concentration. 221 Rather, the claimed salt
is stated to be more effective because the active molecule has been chemically
altered through its reaction with methansulfonic acid and a subsequent
crystallization process to be more thermodynamically stable, less hygroscopic,
and possess superior flow properties. 222
Moreover, the polymorph of imatinib claimed in the patent is actually the
only form that is usable in a form administrable to patients. As counsel
Tehmtan R. Andhyarujina argued on behalf of Novartis, it is only the beta
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate that is used in Glivec. 223 If a drug cannot
be administered, its chemical potency in vitro arguably has no therapeutic
effect. In that respect, imatinib free base or even imatinib mesylate in general
and Effects of Novel Anticancer Drugs Berberine and Betulinic Acid, PLOS ONE, Mar. 10, 2014,
Vol. 9 Issue 3, at 1, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%/3Adoi%/.
219 Id
220 See e.g., Godugu et al., supra note 218 (explaining that as a result of "poor bioavailability,"
"large doses" of anticancer drug candidates berberine and betulinic acid are currently required to
achieve pharmacologically desired activity).
221 Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 7 (India), available at http://suprem
ecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf. Cf International Patent Application WO 99/03854,
page 22, availabk at file:///C:/Users/ddu/Desktop/personal/9006361800b35af.pdf or http://pate
nscope.wipo.int/search/en/detai.jsf?docld=W01999003854&recNum=1&maxRec=1&office=&p
revFilter=&sortOption=Pub+Date+Desc&queryString=FP%3A%2899%2FO3854%29&tab=PCT
Description.
222 Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 85, 88, 94 (India), available at
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf. Cf. International Patent Application WO
99/03854, pages 3, 8, available at file:///C:/Users/ddu/Desktop/Personal/9006361 800b35af.pdf
or http://patentscope.vipo.int/search/en/detail.jsfdocld-WO1999003854&recNum=1&maxRec
=1&office=&prevFilter=&sortOption=Pub+Date+Desc&queryStrong=FP%3A%2899%2F03854
%29&tab=PCTDescription.
M Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit, supra note 86; Gleevec, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.
com/pro/gleevec.html (last visited May 24, 2014).
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lacks therapeutic effect; it is only the beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate
that has any therapeutic effect.
B. REINTERPRETATION OF ENHANCED EFFICACY ON APPEAL
On appeal, Novartis lost for the essential reason that the Supreme Court of
India affirmed the IPAB's interpretation of efficacy as therapeutic efficacy,
using the IPAB's definition of the term. If the Supreme Court had instead
construed enhanced efficacy to require some type of improved efficacy, but
interpreted efficacy broadly, Novartis' application would have fulfilled Section
3(d)'s demands. Finally, if the Court had decided to read enhanced efficacy into
the inventive step and industrial application requirements, aforiori, Novartis's
patent application would have survived Section 3(d). The differing outcomes
under these three interpretations exemplify the problem Section 3(d) poses to
the future of pharmaceutical innovation and operations in India. Below, I argue
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 3(d) wrongfully precludes
the patenting of a pharmaceutical like Glivec in NovartisAG.
First, if there exist cases in which a drug company deceives the public into
demanding the latest version of a drug though the new version works no better
than the old, such is not the case in Novartis AG. Novartis was not trying to
deceive patients into demanding imatinib mesylate, when imatinib free base or
some other salt was just as effective. Whereas other salts and forms of imatinib
were not stable enough to be encapsulated and administered as a cancer
treatment, the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate claimed in Novartis's
rejected application was.224 Glivec, which uses this form of imatinib mesylate,
has been widely recognized as a breakthrough drug for treating chronic myeloid
leukemia (CML) by both Novartis's supporters and detractors.225
Second, demand for Glivec by generics and NGOs like Lawyers Collective
has been extremely high.226 Considering that Indians are more price sensitive
and many cannot afford branded versions of expensive drugs, the fact that
Glivec has been commercially successful and patients prefer Glivec suggests
that Glivec has enhanced efficacy above the prior art. That is, imatinib mesylate
224 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.
in/Orders/100-2009.htm ("Because of the advantageous properties, beta-crystal form is superior
to the alpha form with respect to the manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations in solid
dosages."). Claim 11 of the rejected application was "[a] pharmaceutical composition, comprising
a form of the methanesulfonic acid addition salt of a compound of formula 1" NovartisAG.
225 Pray, supra note 58; Access March, supra note 62, at 1 (describing Glivec as "a runaway
blockbuster raking in millions of dollars in Its first year").
226 Basheer & Reddy, supra note 73, at 134 (explaining that several generic drug companies and
an NGO, the Cancer Patients Aid Association (CPAA), opposed the Novartis application for
imatinib mesylate).
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in beta crystalline form and not imatinib free base is what saves lives. Those
who do not believe the innovative leap from imatinib to imatinib mesylate in
beta crystalline form qualifies Novartis for a new patent have yet to identify an
alternative salt or polymorph of imatinib that could be used in a commercial
drug.
Third, the secondary patent demanded would in this case preclude the sale of
generic Glivec after the expiration of a hypothetical patent on imatinib free
base, 227 but this is due to the nature of the secondary patent as the specific
usable form in this case. It is not because the secondary patent would extend
patent protection over the original invention, which it would not. Novartis's
1993 patent on imatinib did not disclose or enable the use of a usable anticancer
drug.228 Rather, the invention of the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate
and the discovery of its anticancer properties and amenability to storage in solid
dosage required much additional research, which the IPAB opinion
recognized. 229  IPAB further conceded that Glivec satisfies the other
requirements for patentability, including inventive step and industrial
application.230  It is inconsistent to argue, then, that the invention of Glivec
took little effort and ingenuity above the prior art.
Last and relatedly, it is the invention of imatinib mesylate, not imatinib free
base, that society should aim to incentivize with its patent laws. A patent on
imatinib alone could still incentivize the development of a commercial drug that
227 As explained above, however, in the particular case of Novarlis AG, this is not a concern
because Novartis did not get an original patent on imatinib in India.
228 It is a well-established under U.S. patent law that a patent on a "genus" of compounds does
not necessarily preclude a patent on a particular "species" within that "genus." See, e.g., Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd, 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (" 'In essence, patentability is not precluded by the fact that an inventor identified or
selected a single compound with particularly desirable qualities from a large class of previously
patented compounds."); Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(a prior art reference that discloses a genus does not necessarily disclose every species that is a
member of that broad genus). Counsel for Novartis proffered to the Supreme Court that while
the prior patent on imatinib free base covers imatinib mesylate, it does not enable or disclose it, as
would be required for anticipation. Novartis AG v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, at 73-
75 (India), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf. However, the
Supreme Court rather bizarrely rejected the notion as "negat[ing] the fundamental rule underlying
the grant of patents." Id. at 75.
229 Novartis AG v. Union of India (IPAB June 26, 2009), available at http://www.ipab.rn.nic.in/
Orders/100-2009.htm ("What 1993 patent disclosed was the possibility of making various salt
forms of the imatinib free base which could run into hundreds.... [it could not have been
concluded by any stretch of imagination that the particular beta crystalline form of imatinib
mesylate would have advantageous properties which would be efficacious in the treatment of
cancer. It was only after years of painstaking and expensive research that imatinib mesylate salt in a
particular crystal form... was discovered by the Appellant." (emphasis added)).
230 Id.
39
Du: Novartis Ag v. Union of India: "Evergreening," Trips, and "Enhanc
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2014
J. INTELL PROP. L[
utilizes it, since there would be no way to profit from imatinib unless and until a
commercially viable drug was developed.231 However, that incentive would be
more incidental than targeted towards the true invention. As explained in Part
IV.B.3, the effective length of the patent term-the period over which a
pharmaceutical company has market exclusivity and thus can recoup its costs-
would be based arbitrarily on how long it takes to get the commercially viable
drug to market. In contrast, a patent on the commercially viable product would
incentivize the development of the product directly and eliminate the
arbitrariness of effectively different patent terms.
Perhaps India's true objection to pharmaceutical patents is that patent
protection for pharmaceutical products is too strong and the term too long,
considering that many Indian patients cannot afford the sticker price .for life-
saving drugs like Glivec. If that is the case, it may be legitimate under a social
welfare theory. However, as noted in Part IV.B.4, these arguments should be
made explicit so that the international dialogue and related litigation can focus
on what the debate is truly about-the fact that India wants an exceptional
patent provision because it believes its social and economic conditions are
exceptional. Until India acknowledges its social welfare theory of patent
protection, it cannot expect TRIPS and other international treaties to be
modified according to its needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Indian Supreme Court's decision in Novartis AG is about much more
than Novartis's application to patent the beta crystalline form of imatinib
mesylate. Rather, the decision will, over time, settle many important questions
whose answers will shape the future of the pharmaceutical sector in India: What
does Section 3(d) demand for obtaining a secondary patent on a known
substance when it requires enhanced efficacy? Which interpretation of
enhanced efficacy will be applied in future cases?
This Article argued that the Supreme Court's construction of enhanced
efficacy, an additional requirement to patent pharmaceutical products, above
and beyond industrial application and inventive step, violates TRIPS Article
27.1. Moreover, it argued that the Supreme Court, IPAB, and High Court's
decision to pursue the narrowest interpretation of enhanced efficacy in Novartis
AG is most consistent with a general desire to curb pharmaceutical patenting,
although the courts have declined to embrace this rationale. Instead, they have
231 See Scotchmer, supra note 205, at 30 ("[1]ncentives to find fundamental technologies may
require that tit first patent holder earn profit from the second generation products that follow.
There will b , no such profit if no second-generation products follow.").
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based their decisions on an evergreening rationale that is theoretically
incoherent. If Section 3(d) achieves its stated goal of preventing evergreening
in the sense of patenting useless, minor modifications of drugs, then by
definition, Section 3(d) makes little or no difference in access to generic
medicines. On the other hand, if Section 3(d) actually promotes earlier access
to generic medicines, then it must do so by precluding the patenting of genuine
innovations and free-riding on innovations incentivized by stronger patent
regimes. Thus, even if the results have been consistent with India's underlying
social welfare goals, the reasoning behind these decisions has been flawed.
Whether India wishes to interpret enhanced efficacy (1) to require no more
than inventive step and industrial application, (2) to mean improved efficacy in
a broad sense, or (3) to mean therapeutic efficacy, depends on which legal and
policy rationales it finds most appealing and legally sustainable going forward.
The Author hopes that India succeeds in reconciling the Supreme Court's
decision to choose (3) with both the theoretical underpinnings and practical
realities of pharmaceutical patenting and innovation in India.
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